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1. Introduction 
A new spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of Foresight. In the last decade Foresight [1]
has become a fashionable word in documents and conversations of science and 
technology policy makers all over Europe [2]. After the reincarnation of the future studies in 
the modern form of foresight in the mid-eighties [3], [4], the design and implementation of 
some exemplars (as the German Delphi [5], [6], the UK Technology Foresight [7],  the 
Dutch Foresight Program [8], or the French Key Technologies [9]), and some general 
reviews [10], [11], [12], [13], we observe that almost every year new governments promote 
or commission foresight activities associated to science, technology and innovation (STI) 
policies and more European countries join the “Foresight Club” (recently Italy [14], Austria 
[15], Hungary, Sweden,...), not to mention Australia, New Zealand, etc. 
What is fuelling the renewed interest of governments on technology foresight? Scholars 
have embraced this new fashionable faith with the impetus of the converse, and 
propagandists have emerged glorifying the virtues of foresight, insisting on the "intrinsic" 
value of the new tool or approach for STI policies. Some analysts point out that this 
salience of Foresight is because it has become the solution to the problems posed by the 
new challenges of  STI policies (for example international competitiveness and the 
concerns on the technological competitive decline of Europe vis à vis Japan and USA), 
while others interpret the situation in terms of international diffusion or imitation of 
management practices. Whatever the driving force, many policy makers in Europe have 
embraced the rhetoric of foresight and some of them have adopted the new tools, either as 
a form of experimenting or as a way of not being part of the shrinking group of countries 
that ignore the promised land that foresight appears to represent.  
Because this fashion, the dominant approaches are biased by the normative assumptions 
and prescriptive propositions of Foresight, while very little attention is given to address the 
empirical study of real Foresight practices in different countries. However we think that the 
quality of Foresight practice could be improved with a better understanding of the cognitive, 
socio-political and policy conditions in which it emerges. The kind of questions that guide 
our reflection are to improve our understanding of the growth, development and diffusion of 
the different forms of Foresight taken in European countries[16]. 
This paper will develop an analytical framework to better understand the empirical problems 
that Foresight as a practice is raising and  give arguments to explore the diversity in 
relationships between governments and Foresight. For understanding Foresight and its 
evolution in the different countries we insist on the need to consider its science and 
technology policy context and arrangements surrounding the emergence or non emergence 
of Foresight. We have to approach foresight in governmental arenas just as one of the 
possible tools or strategies available for decisions makers. When considering the selection 
of this practice (and its concrete form) this is conditioned by the specific forces and 
circumstances emerging from local environments. Therefore, we have made the attempt of 
approaching foresight in its STI policies context, because Foresight, its effects and benefits 
cannot be considered independently of its institutional arrangements in the policy arena.  
The main aim of the paper is to explain the variation of fates and fortunes of the foresight in 
governmental environments in Europe. In the following section some general properties of 
the policy making process are explored to help us to conceptualise the emergence of 
foresight as a part of the general dynamic of policy making, linking problems and solutions. 
In the third section of this paper we will report on some developments of the Spanish 
situation, understanding how the S&T policy arena and the existing institutional 
arrangements constrained foresight development. This approach will help better 
understand the dynamics of technology foresight evolution in Europe. 
After the exploration of Foresight practice, we will come to the issue of value and effects of 
Foresight. In section four we will try to improve our general understanding of  Foresight 
reflecting on the complex role of information in decision making in an organisational 
context. Information or Foresight can be substantive inputs for the decision making process 
but they also play a central role on the legitimation of decisions and policy makers. Finally 
we will develop some reflections on the future of foresight and its potential, that is, as 
process of actor interactions that could help to improve the coordination of the innovation 
systems. 
  
2. Foresight as an embedded practice in policy making 
We insist on the importance of the context, and we state that foresight, if it gains relevance, 
could be understood as a "local practice" emerged and consolidated (in competition with 
other local practices or outside practices) in specific policy arenas. Country specificity and 
policy context are our explanatory variables of the wide differences on foresight practices. 
In this section we will try to develop some insights from the theory of policy making to 
understand how and under what circumstances foresight activities become a plausible 
solution (or is incorporated into a solution) for some of the issues and problems associated 
to STI policies and, thus, explain why in other circumstances it does not. In section three 
we will apply the argument to understand the Spanish case. 
The emergence of Foresight in some countries could be treated as a case of “policy 
innovation”, but to understand this we should make clear our model of  policy process. 
Kingdon [17] identifies three “streams” that develop independently and determine 
opportunities in the policy process: problems, solutions and politics. The regular 
development of each stream is relatively independent of the others and the matching 
between streams is at the core of policy innovation; the effect of this model is the existence 
of randomness and contingency in the outcomes. 
This matching process between problems and solutions depend on two variables, the 
dynamics of the political system creating the policy window, and the emergence of skilful 
political entrepreneurs to handle the fitting. The former are fostered by significant political 
changes, or crisis [18]  and they represent  the preconditions for  merging or matching of 
the different streams, but connecting them is dependent on the actions of policy 
entrepreneurs [19]. The policy process is mainly determined by the artful connection of 
solutions to problems; different actors in diverse institutional arrangements follow different 
patterns, as is demonstrated by the diversity of missions and understandings of foresight as 
the comparison of United Kingdom  with The Netherlands show us. Meanwhile policy 
entrepreneurs are the brokers who orchestrate the fitting between problems and solutions 
[20], in such that the policy entrepreneur or "human agency" is a central element in the 
explanation because of their ability to introduce manipulation [21]. 
However  the process of issue definition [22] is at the heart of the political battles because it 
contributes to structuring the problem and also to "advance some solutions". We should 
comprehend how do social phenomena become “policy problems”, that is how public 
attention is focused [23]. Equally relevant is to discern how do specific understandings of 
problems emerge and consolidate, and through what channels do they come to policy 
makers. Argumentation and creation of new understandings of an issue are at the heart of 
the political process. Policy making is influenced by changing definitions of "what social 
conditions are at the heart of political process" (e.g. UK favouring reorientation to client 
approaches, Netherlands improving aggregation, etc) and, at the same time, by changing 
definitions of "what would be the most effective solution to a given public problem".  
This approach gives us the analytical tools to explain policy innovations, foresight could be 
taken as one of them,  however, it is important to account for some historical factors within 
an integrated institutional framework.  History is relevant to understand that problems, 
solutions and politics are not entirely independent. Past experiences and policy choices 
might influence  the set of choices available at  a later time. The identification of problems 
and their definition would be dependent on  previous policy experiences, and therefore on 
learning. The space in which policy entrepreneurs operate is redefined with experience, 
including contact with others’ ideas and suggestions; earlier policies, even in other policy 
domains or taken from international experiences, provide politicians and policy-makers with 
analogies that they use to assess the policy options. The availability of appropriate 
solutions can then be influenced by earlier policies, which direct exploration on new 
innovation along particular lines. 
For searching connections among policies over time and for trying to understand how 
opportunities for innovation emerge we require an historical approach. Policy  innovations, 
such as foresight, can not be taken  in isolation because they are part of a policy sequence 
[24] in which the institutional development facilitates some interpretations of problems and 
makes some prospective policies more plausible than others. In economics, political 
science and policy analysis, there is broad support for this argument, which brings in the 
issue of path dependency [25], [26], trajectories of development and critical junctures [27] 
and policy inheritance [28]. In that way, we insist in how actions taken at one time can 
make some future perception and decision more plausible than another.  
The fact that problems, alternatives, policies and politics are linked over time does not 
mean that we have a determinists model in which the past determines what is possible at a 
later time. Evolution of societies provides a strong case for speculation about the dynamic 
processes of institutional and policy changes. Here we take the concept of co-evolution to 
include, through historical links, the ideas of specialisation (between problems and 
alternatives, and between policy and politics) and mutual dependency, in the context of 
“reciprocal evolutionary change in interacting elements” [29].  Our specific set of policies 
associated to STI have been evolving (and co-evolving) in the last decades [30]. Science 
and Technology policies have received pressures for adaptation from the emergent 
problems of “competitiveness” and “innovation”, centering the focus on firms in a new 
domain of innovation policy. In fact, such transformations of the policy domain can become 
a turning point in a sequence, by creating opportunities for political actors to promote new 
ideas and different visions. Evolution in the policy domain is linked to the  shift  of 
boundaries between policies which is the most likely force to foster the internal dynamics of 
public policies. 
Our final consideration in this section relates to institutional development.  Often new 
institutional arrangements and structures emerged during a period in which new policy 
issues are addressed, and once created they remain in place for years. Institutions 
structure the rules of participation that constrain policy actors patterns of behaviour and 
decision making rules by introducing specific organisational routines and procedures (e.g. 
explicit consideration of the future or process of aggregation of diverse interest). Institutions 
once set up exhibit some everlasting properties. The differences in the relationships 
between science and government shaped and even constrain the development of foresight. 
Governments, as key players in the national innovation system, have many roles and may 
even employ foresight as a strategic action in order to cope with the uncertainties.  
What is important to stress here is that policy output  is contingent upon variables such as 
the critical social conditions, desired innovation rates, specific understandings, particular 
policy strategies, etc. Instruments such as foresight analyses are secondary to policy 
strategies because there is a wide variety of options available to policy makers that can be 
chosen to implement effectively policy objectives. Even when foresight has become the 
solution for certain problems (in the discourse and the rhetoric of policy making) in some 
countries, in other countries foresight plays either a partial role or other solutions have been 
established for similar or even different problems. Solutions adopted do not have a unique 
and universal value; policy makers adopt those that are most appropriate to given 
situations. But again, even if at the end of the eighties policy-makers identified the lack of 
technological leadership and competitive shortcomings as a major policy issue, only in few 
European countries foresight had become the main solution, for tackling them. 
  
3. The contingent nature of technology foresight: some lessons from the Spanish 
case for understanding the general development of Foresight 
The demand of foresight, as an information tool for policy makers, has increased rapidly;  it 
even has emerged in some countries as "the solution" or has been placed at the centre of 
the discourse to tackle to the most important problems in science, technology and 
innovation policies. It is reported that in some countries in Europe, (UK is the paradigmatic 
case) Foresight, as an organised process or collective consultation on plausible future 
developments, has been recently used as a main framework for science and technology 
policy coordination [31].  
Nonetheless, the diversity among countries of Foresight, in the timing, the forms or the 
features of future concerns in STI policy is very significant. When comparing the extent of 
adoption of a policy in different countries some approaches focus on the national 
“preconditions” necessary for the policy development (relative levels of income, or other 
variables) while others insist on the identifiable diffusion process (geographical or cultural). 
Probably, when observing the adoption of foresight as a practice both processes should be 
taken into account; that is, the specificity of the institutional arrangements for STI policy and 
the forces in action which have created the conditions for adopting it. In fact foresight in its 
forms is emerging as a local practice.  
In certain countries, a process of imitation, policy transfer [32] or learning from others has 
occurred. Nevertheless without the public intervention in favour of S&T, there is little 
chance of governmental involvement in foresight, to be taken either as rhetoric or as a 
practice. However  having STI policy by itself does not guarantee the adoption of  foresight, 
as can be witnessed by the Spanish case. In this section we will reflect on the conditions 
and factors related to enhancing or precluding the inclusion of foresight in the repertoires of 
tools of  STI policy makers, always with reference to Spain, but trying to enlighten the 
development of foresight in Europe. 
Our objective is explaining why a country like Spain, an early adopter (at least rhetorical 
adopter) of foresight in relation to STI policies, has not developed a formal foresight 
exercise brings us to two different insights: One, very simplistic, that blames the less 
developed countries for not adopting the "best practices" at the right time or just because 
they are less developed; however, exploring that argument is not very useful in analytical 
terms. This leads us therefore to try to understand how the development and use of 
foresight, as an implicit normative model, is contingent on some forces and dynamics. In 
the pages that follows we will use the case of the first attempts to bring foresight into the 
policy agenda in the context of  the definition of the Spanish RTD policy as a way of 
bringing some light to the general problem of foresight development. 
We will begin by discussing the S&T policy context to understand the framing conditions. 
Then we will present how and when foresight (as rhetoric and as an activity) emerged in 
Spain. Finally, we will discuss why foresight, although institutionalised has not been such a 
central tool for policy coordination and policy making as in other countries. 
  
a) The context of science and technology policy in Spain  
We will begin our discussion of the context of S&T policy in Spain during the mid-1980s to 
locate our analysis in its specific policy sequence. When Spain became a part of the 
European Communities, in 1986, the dominant discourse was the so called the “European 
Paradox”, the recognition of a strong research and science base without the corresponding 
industrial transfer of this knowledge. Actions in Spain shared the European approach –with 
some local rhetoric like the idea “to put the academic research capabilities to work for the 
social and economic needs”- while  government RTD policy concentrated its efforts on 
improving the quality and quantity of its public R&D base with huge increase in public 
spending .  
The political impulse culminated in 1986 when the Parliament passed the Law for the 
Promotion and General Coordination for Scientific Research and Technology Development 
[33], also known as the Law of Science. With this Law a National R&D Plan (a four year 
plan presently in its third edition, 1996-99) was established in order to coordinate, plan and 
promote R&D activities. Coordination [34] had been a key word in Spanish S&T policy 
making: the need to coordinate the directions of the research activities of the main actors 
(firms, universities, public research centres) and the need to coordinate the S&T policy 
initiatives of the different Spanish public administrations. However the main emphasis of the 
reform was in the “administrative coordination”, as OECD [35] criticised.  
In fact, the National R&D Plan has imitated the basic structure and conception of the 
European R&D Framework Programmes; its priorities included some of the issues and 
research topics that are the main concern of public decision makers and at the same time, 
aggregated most of the “demands” of the research actors involved in the consultative and 
decision making processes. In addition to the high level of steering and priority setting, 
there was a low level priority determination in the implementation process, associated to 
the research actors’ interests, which played a role of aggregation. The Plan, that could be 
interpreted as part of the emerging strategic science models [36], aimed to confront the 
needs of coordinating the different research activities and strategies of the actors through 
prioritising some of  the research fields and topics. Funding incentives to carry on these 
activities were the main mechanisms for alignment of research actors between themselves 
and with the government. 
At this time an Inter-ministerial Commission for Science and Technology (CICYT-Comisión 
Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología ) was created whose main responsibility was to 
design, promote, support and steer the development of  R&D activities in public research 
institutions, and incentivate firms’ RTD activities, following the priorities set by the National 
R&D Plan. After some vicissitudes and rearrangements the CICYT is now chaired by the 
Prime Minister, the general management of the National R&D Plan has been transferred to 
the Ministry of Education & Culture, and a newly created Office of Science and Technology 
(OCYT), directly under the Prime Minister’s office, is  in charge of issues like coordinating 
RTD policies, conducting studies or analysing the Spanish S&T capabilities.  
Despite that there was an institutionalised locus for S&T policy coordination -the CICYT- 
since 1986, the fact is there has been no single science and research policy domain in the 
country besides the coordination rhetoric. The Spanish system is characterised by the 
sectorial fragmentation of both, the R&D activities and the S&T policies. Although big 
attempts were made during the mid-1980s to establish a single and articulated policy for 
science, technology and innovation, the initiative clearly did not succeed and different policy 
domains and strategies, at national and at regional level, are still in action. Nonetheless, 
recent dynamics in the elaboration of the IV National R&D Plan (2000-2003) could offer 
new  prospects. 
  
b) The emergence of prospective studies in Spain and its institutional arrangements. 
In the mid-1980s, foresight and evaluation were considered very important for the 
government action in S&T policy planning and an administrative locus in government for 
both activities were institutionalised.  
During the preparatory work for the draft of the “Law of Science”, in 1985 and later on while 
elaborating and drafting the First National R&D Plan 1988-91, were when the idea of 
“prospectiva tecnológica” [37] (technology foresight) was brought back into the arena of 
modern Spanish RTD policy [38].  
The Law fixed that, one of the main criteria used in the process of defining S&T objectives 
for the various areas and programmes was the “identification of future technological 
developments” (art 4 of the Law), however no formal procedure was established and this 
was left to the criteria and practical arrangements made by policy makers. In fact formal 
foresight exercises did not play a central role in the selection of priorities at the high level of 
aggregation, however the drafting of the First National R&D Plan did involve a consultative 
process with experts, researchers, administrations interested and some firm 
representatives. At that time, the Government reported that around half a thousand experts 
were involved in the process of setting priorities, mainly using the procedure of committees 
and panels. 
In the regulative  development of the Law of Science, a government decree in 1987 defined 
the “organisational and administrative structure to support the action of the CICYT and its 
permanent Commission”. A unit called National Agency of Evaluation and Foresight 
(ANEP-Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva) was created, with an organic level 
of sub-Directorate General. Surprisingly, this high level of institutionalisation of foresight 
function in a bureaucratic organisation -ANEP- did not end up in a momentum for a 
National Foresight process in the Spanish S&T Policy. The ANEP was a regular 
administrative unit of  government, with no independent budget or resources and its 
mission included the organisation of the evaluation process of the research projects to be 
funded by the national R&D programs, and the  promotion of prospective studies in areas of 
interest of the CICYT. But in practice, the ANEP concentrated its activity in organising the 
administrative infrastructure to facilitate peer review evaluation of the R&D project 
proposals at a large scale and with sufficient independence to create credibility in the 
process of public funding of RTD [39]. 
Certain aspects have contributed to the difficulty for integrating the prospective activities at 
ANEP into the main stream decision making process for S&T policies. On one hand, the 
organisational construction of the ANEP reflected its high capabilities in managing project 
evaluation and the ability to organise the assessment of the scientific quality of a project 
proposal, taking into account the state of the art scientific development [40]. But 
consequently, the activities related to foresight remained at the level of producing 
prospective reports which were highly academically focused, as opposed to having a 
market view, a necessary aspect needed in the integration of S&T and innovation policies.  
On the other hand, the ANEP, which was administratively dependent of the Ministry of 
Education & Science –instead of Industry- had only academic expertise with little industrial 
involvement, and thus it was an improbable institutional place for promoting and 
implementing a large scale and strongly formalised Foresight, that by definition needs a 
strong involvement of users (both industry and policy makers). This institutional 
arrangement for foresight in the Spanish government contributes to understand why in 
almost all foresight exercises or “experiments”, we see that the main players have always 
remained in the academic circles. What is evident is that unlike other countries, where the 
industrial actors have played an important role, in Spain this has not been the case. 
Since the new conservative government took office in 1996 the situation has changed. The 
Ministry of Industry & Energy is developing a project to determine the future technological 
demands for Spanish industry in collaboration with firms and business associations; along 
these lines the Ministry had organised a network among specialised industrial and 
technological centres which support specific R&D needs for firms, the Industrial Technology 
Foresight Observatory (OPTI-Observatorio de Prospectiva Tecnológica Industrial),  in order 
to monitor and foresee technological trends and help the Ministry of Industry and the 
Government in their definition of RTD priorities and strategies. 
Also, directly under the Prime Minister’s office is the newly created Office of Science and 
Technology (OCYT) which will be in charge of coordinating RTD policies, conducting 
studies and analysing the Spanish S&T capabilities. Included within the definition of the 
legal competencies of the OCYT, is the responsibility for the “implementation and 
development of technology foresight in Spain” in coordination with other ministries.  
In this new context, the prospective studies have played a much more relevant role in the 
preparatory activities for the new National R&D Plan (2000-2003), now under preparation. 
The OCYT has requested a review of the foresight studies in a few technologies to the 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) of the European Commission [41], 
some other sectorial technologies foresight studies have been provided by OPTI, and 
specific studies on the firms technological demands have been elaborated. Apparently in 
this preparatory work for the new plan, the information on future technological trends has 
become more relevant. Therefore these evolutions may open the door to changes in 
relation to the future development of governmental foresight initiatives with general 
character in addition to the already developed within considered technological priorities 
[42].  
  
c)  Why foresight being highly institutionalised remained outside the S&T policy 
planning?  
The Spanish situation of foresight development is puzzling. Foresight being highly 
institutionalised in a bureaucratic locus since the end of the eighties, and it has been 
marginal and remained outside the S&T policy planning until very recently. A final reflection 
on these issues will confirm some of the arguments raised on the symbolic role of foresight 
in decision making, on the relevance of the policy context and on the constraints that 
institutions impose on the development of foresight and other policy solutions. 
The complex situation of foresight in Spain could be characterised as follows: 1) Spain 
scores low in the conceptualisation of foresight as an explicit process in S&T policy 
planning; in fact it has not gained relevance in priority setting until recently. 2) It also scores 
low in the degree of formalisation of foresight as, methodical and systematic, production of 
information and knowledge on future trends and perspectives at national level. 3) It  scores 
very low in the methodological developments or technical sophistication of foresight as a 
tool. 4) However, it scores very high in the institutionalisation of the foresight as a "function" 
in Spanish bureaucracy. Overall, foresight, when present, has been limited to a secondary 
role as an information product, with no explicit connection to S&T coordination policy 
through interaction between research and innovation actors. 
There are some specific conditions of the Spanish policy context that could contribute to 
understand why foresight being present (as other information tools) has not played a key 
role in S&T policy, that is, it did not emerge as the solution to the Spanish S&T problems. 
The general socio-economic conditions, in which the political and policy actors operate, 
have not enhanced the need to use foresight as a main tool in the legitimation process of 
the S&T policy making. The problems identified as issues for public intervention were the 
low level of R&D expenditure and the lack of S&T policy coordination. The “solutions” 
employed were increasing public funding and the National R&D Plan. The Spanish context 
of S&T policy has been one characterised by strong growth of R&D funding, in which the 
definition of RTD priorities through a National R&D Plan has been simultaneous to the 
increase of “non-prioritised funds”. The CICYT got the credit of the good performance and, 
until mid nineties, very little questioning of the S&T policy occurs. Thus support from the 
public or  legitimation of policy making resulted mainly from huge increases of R&D funds. 
On a more general level, in Europe, funding is also becoming restrictive, and at the same 
time there is a need to select priorities, as well as the social forces that demand 
accountability and  legitimation of public funding. Within this context, Foresight that has 
emerged in other European countries may be responding to these pressures  by 
contributing to the legitimation process and the selection of R&D priorities. Being 
responsive and accountable are two central elements of the new type of pressures that 
policy makers have in a context of budget constraints. However this type of pressure in 
Spain has been less relevant, because the environment of S&T policy has brought 
significant increases of public funding. 
There are also some other issues concerning the concrete institutional arrangements in 
which foresight emerged. Although foresight  was recognised as relevant mechanism for 
policy planning, the lack of industrial involvement may have handicapped setting up 
technology foresight, that is a solution conceptually linked more to technology and 
innovation policies than to science policy. ANEP remained too closely tied to the academic 
circles, which was needed for its good performance of the peer review evaluations, but was 
missing the link to industry. Consequently, foresight, in general, has been taken on at an 
academic level, sectorial nature (single technology/science field), using less formal 
methodologies (discussion groups or experts reports). Institutionalised foresight in a 
bureaucratic locus had not been able to influence the main stream S&T policy making 
process and strategy development, because it had been isolated within the Ministry of 
Education & Science and separated from the industrial context. 
The question we pose is why should rational policy makers become involved in foresight 
processes as central frameworks for S&T prioritisation if the tools in use allow them to steer 
and aggregate [43], to promote coordination through incentives and to align actors with 
direct financial subsidies and public sector intervention. What incentives could policy 
makers have to promote changes that favour the use of foresight as an strategic tool for 
coordination through interactions, instead of keeping safe to the more traditional, and 
bureaucratic or interest dominated, policy making process? We only have one strong 
answer: pressures for adaptation emerging from an environmental political or policy 
change. 
We suggest that foresight, especially in a centrally promoted and interactive form, emerges 
in a policy context in which policy makers react to the process of loosing ground in S&T. 
We should expect much more propensity for emergence of foresight when the general role 
of government has been reduced in such circumstances we witness today without move 
towards the globalisation of the economy. In the context of RTD, especially in high 
technology areas, governments have always had a high level of intervention: direct 
implementation through  public R&D, allocation of funds, coordination and definition of 
priorities or public procurement because the government functions as main client for S&T. 
In Europe, until recently, the governments had a very important role in the economy. 
However, nowadays, we see that foresight emerges during a period where the process of 
liberalisation and privatisation has been diminishing the role of the government as key actor 
in the economy. With these trends of privatisation of public firms and liberalisation of the 
markets, S&T research has been directly affected.  Government and policy-makers may be 
responding to this decrease in importance with new mechanisms, such as formalised 
foresight exercises of consultation and interaction, in order to provide them with the 
necessary instruments for incentives and influence over the private actors and innovation 
process. 
In Spain, until very recently the main industrial players in RTD development were public 
companies or governmental customers; in fact in mid-eighties the Government action to 
promote technological development was mainly organised directly through big public 
industrial and services companies. Today, however, Spain has also been involved in the 
process of privatisation and liberalisation . This may suggest  that,  in addition to the 
restraints that “competition policy” introduces in the financial incentives for RTD promotion, 
in recent times government has found advantageous the use of foresight in the context of 
defining S&T priorities. 
  
4. Assessing our expectations on the effects of Foresight in policy making 
In this  part of the paper we enter into the analysis of the usefulness of Foresight. To 
improve our understanding (both in empirical and prescriptive terms) we suggest to 
confront Foresight with the models and theories of decision making.  Main stream analysis 
on foresight  does not make explicit many of the assumptions in which it is based on, but 
we can say that dominant approaches are coherent with the rational model of decision 
making. 
In spite of the fashion of foresight it is our claim that one of the  weaknesses of the 
dominant views rests upon the low degree of integration of foresight thinking within decision 
making models and theories of organisational action and policy analysis departing 
significantly from rational based approaches.  We claim that the underlining model of 
decision making in conventional foresight analysis lacks robustness, especially if we 
consider the role of information in decisional contexts.  
Foresight scholars and policy makers found a relevant distinction between the output or the 
product of the foresight, that usually is information, and the process of foresight. Most of the 
defenders of foresight state that in foresight the relevant issue is the process more than the 
product, although it is not conceivable to imagine a process that does result in a product. 
  
a) The role of foresight as information for decision making. 
Most of the foresight literature is based on the idea that the aim of foresight is to produce 
new information (elaborated through a process of making explicit, for experts or layman, 
expectations on future technological developments) that will be a crucial input  for  policy 
makers decisions. 
Hence, good information (in terms of quality and frequency) is essential to improving 
decision making. However, considering only this side of the problem implies a very ideal 
view of the decision making process. The implicit model of decision making underlining 
foresight is viewed as a result of intended rational calculation and is based on an evaluation 
of alternatives in terms of their consequences for preferences. Foresight as an information  
output (documents, reports, etc.) can be understood as some of the data that decision and 
policy makers request to be more informed. In this context, the choice depends on what 
future alternatives are considered in two aspects: what the future states, that is conditional 
to the choice, and how the decision maker will feel about that future world. However, the 
empirical robustness of the rational model, especially in those circumstances in which 
information about potential outcomes may not be easily acquired, is questioned [44]. 
The problem with this model is the loose couple relation that information has with decision 
making. Decision makers become involved in systematic processes of information 
producing, gathering and storing for decision. And foresight in this policy making context 
could be seen as one more, some people see it as the critical one, of the informational 
activities. The conventional theory of decision making predicts that actors (and policy 
makers) search up information to a sensible limit within a balance between the cost of 
producing information and the benefits that any additional bit of information will produce. 
There are assumptions that if decision and policy makers act rationally, they will gather and 
use the information produced through  foresight exercises. 
However the observed relations between information and decision making are not as easy 
or clear as the conventional theories predict. Policy-makers face not only bounded 
rationality conditions,  uncertainty, information asymmetries and limitations, and heuristic 
biases but institutional limitations and social judgement. We suggest that there are hard 
and critical choices made in institutional settings that require a better understanding of the 
ideologies and normative model that have guided choices. Consequently, decision makers 
exhibit patterns of behaviour guided by organisational settings that shape the gathering, 
storage and use of information and foresight exercises. We suggest that foresight and 
information emerging from it, is embedded in social norms that make it a symbol and a 
signal [45], [46]. We think that the case of foresight can be additionally enlightened 
considering the situations in which policy makers treat the gathering and use of information 
as part of the pursuit of its symbolic meaning in addition to the resolution of decision 
uncertainties. 
We suggest that the symbolic properties of information within organisational settings will 
help us to understand the conditions from which foresight emerges and especially the forms 
and ways it is used within these organisations, that is governments. Foresight reports and 
exercises, as many other information pieces, are also symbols in the overall context of 
policy making. To have them, to possess information is a symbol and a representation of 
their competence for the decision making exercise. Moreover the stock and quality of 
information and its use for justifying the decision making process is a way of symbolising or 
signalling that the process is legitimate, particularly when the decisions taken depart 
significantly from organisational and institutional habits and routines. Foresight has been 
growing in this organisational context in which a good decision maker is one who makes 
decisions in a proper way, who exhibits expertise and uses generally accepted information.  
Finally, another dimension of information within institutional settings in general, and 
concerning complex policy choices in particular, is the reduced ability of a single policy 
actor to determine the decision and to influence in the outcome. Such contexts do not offer 
actors the incentives to become informed and to make intensive use of the information 
available. We argue that this reduces  the motivation of policy makers to allocate cognitive 
resources to the building of new scenarios and improving information on future 
technological scenarios. In this context, cognitive costs are understood as the costs 
involved in the acquiring and interpretation of new data and information plus the social 
costs associated with seeking new alternatives that will differ from habits and routines.  
To summarise, policy contexts and institutional settings in which choices on science and 
technology are made depart significantly from the deductive rational procedure assumed by 
current foresight analysis. Moreover, legitimation and social reputation of decision makers 
stimulates production, and conceit of information, well beyond what is used to resolve 
substantive uncertainties.  
In spite of the above mentioned contextual factors it is important to consider that the 
dominant type of policies associated to science and technology have properties of 
distributive policies [47], and they have a special need for legitimation, either based on 
rational arguments or on consensus building between actors. Therefore, decision making in 
this policy context is shaped by needs of legitimation of the authoritative decisions (e.g. on 
R&D priority setting or on allocation R&D funds). In addition there are also two socio-
political contexts in which legitimation of  decisions become a crucial issue for policy 
makers: (i) when there is a general questioning of the public action in relation to civil 
society, as it was the case in the UK during the eighties, and (ii) when there is a shortage in 
public funding and thus a need for selection criteria. 
Thus, when legitimacy becomes a necessary property of effective decisions (in the 
bureaucratic environments), the consumption of information is a feasible and sensible 
strategy for decision makers. In this context, decision makers gather information and do not 
use it; ask for more and ignore it; make decisions first and look for relevant information 
afterward; gather and process a great deal of information that has little or no direct 
relevance for decisions. Information requested and used is much more likely to become a 
signal when indeed the criteria for assessing performance moves towards uncertainty and 
ambiguity, particularly in the case when we are dealing with choices about future 
trajectories of technological development and possible future consequences of present 
actions [48]. 
Foresight process could have impact in STI policies because when organisations establish 
information systems, regardless of the initial reasons, they create a dynamic by their own 
which shapes the overall process. However we cannot forget that information (especially 
labelled as technology foresight) could become one symbol or indicator of the legitimate 
competencies (as other tools also do) of policy-makers more than a substantive 
contribution to decisions. 
Because foresight has the properties of information, in such policy contexts and institutional 
settings, we could expect that foresight information can be replaced by  other types of 
information or tools that will provide  symbols of legitimacy for appropriate STI policy 
making. All these factors are critical  to understand why some policy entrepreneurs 
promoted, with more impetus, foresight in some countries than in others, but in all cases 
the level of foresight consumption will depend on the sources, forms and needs of 
legitimation of policy-makers and to what extent competing information tools develop. 
  
b) Can foresight be of value for coordinating the innovation system? 
In the previous section we have developed a theoretical framework on the role of 
information in organisational decision making process, that has lead us to conclude that  
foresight is also part of the legitimation process of policy-makers. 
Considering that the intention to increase the intelligence of decisions has been usually a 
decisive element in what we expect from human behaviour in this section we will enter into 
normative statements about foresight,  and we will address the issue of the uses of 
foresight to improve management of coordination in innovation systems. 
We have mention the fact that in foresight practices in some countries, a new dimension is 
added to the traditional mission of information production about future. There is some 
insistence that the process of foresight, especially when this process means large scale 
consultation and mobilisation of innovation actors, is much more relevant than the simple 
information product. We [49] already have insisted on the point about the potentials that 
foresight represents as a key tool in relation to the chances of improving coordination 
between the different actors of the innovation system.  
In this sense there are two aspects, the relationship between choice and action, and then 
the forms of action finally taken. When traditional assumptions of rational models  
dominate, the perception of foresight as a information tool for decision making emerges. 
However if we depart from these models and question the issue of goals, that are pre-
existent, we build up some arguments that could provide clues to have a much more 
realistic connection between choice and action [50]. The traditional models assume that 
goals come first and action comes later, but choices are at least as much a process for 
discovering goals as for acting on them [51]. 
The second problem in Foresight as a practice, is the conflict between actors’ interest. 
Government is seeking intelligence in the name of multiple actors, and the preferences and 
identities of those actors are inconsistent with the preferences or identities of other actors. 
These inconsistencies lead to difficulties in exchanging information and cooperation, as 
different actors act intelligently from their own point of view. From this view, interaction is 
not only a process of information exchange but it is also a process of learning and 
negotiation with others. 
Uncertainty characterises choice-making in science and technology policies, and to 
understand decision making under such conditions we must comprehend the role of 
technological futures that agents construct to make sense of the world around them [52]. 
Innovation actors have expectations on the futures developments that could shape its 
behaviour [53], and these expectations could be modelled  through interaction with other 
innovation  actors [54]. Participation in the foresight process could have a positive role in 
adjusting mutual expectations on technological development of the different actors. Then 
foresight could guide mobilisation and organise interaction processes with the aim of 
collective construction of the future technological developments. 
If we assume that choice and action are split, the simple model of foresight as information 
could be seen as a contribution to the practice of foresight; however if we consider that 
objectives are not previous and given, but they adapt to time changes, the interaction 
between actors become a central element of the coordination of human behaviour and a 
plus of the potential uses of foresight to manage the interaction process. 
  
5. Final comments 
On the development of foresight in its policy context we have stated that there is a strong 
association with the needs of legitimation of different STI policies and with the need of 
reducing uncertainty on decision making. Differences in legitimation issues rather than on 
levels of uncertainty faced by policy makers will help to better understand  heterogeneity 
and country specific features. 
For the implications what remains open is whether foresight in Spain,  will evolve from the 
discontinuous foresight studies which have been occurring, and will gain more centrality in 
STI policy making.  
Our general intuition is that we could only expect significant changes in this issue, if there 
were also some significant changes in the political environment, as what in fact happened 
in UK in the eighties, affecting the ability of the public bureaucracy to developed its work, 
pushing them as policy entrepreneurs. Probably likewise the evolution could be a function 
of the legitimation needs of the policy makers confronting the public accountability. And two 
basic forms of legitimation emerge as relevant: the extension of the “technical knowledge 
base” of the decisions and the creation of new conditions for aggregation of preferences 
(and expectations and agendas) of research and innovation actors through interaction and 
consensus building. 
Until recently the aggregation of interests based in any process of policy making was made 
under the exclusive responsibility of the bureaucracy.  Attributing to foresight a relevant role 
in “aligning expectations” will produce significant transformations, consequences and 
implication because it goes to the centre of the political process relating to aggregating 
preferences or interest. Political institutions gain their legitimate authority with elections. All 
the impetus for public accountability, responsiveness, etc. produced strong pressure on the 
public officials. In the UK it was under Thatcher and Major when foresight apparently 
gained relevance, in a time when the legitimation of public action was in crisis and there 
was a strategy for limiting the “public domain”, thus the bureaucrats had the need to re-
legitimise their choices under the technocratic or external society expert competencies. 
In these situations, policy makers need to reassess their legitimation strategy. However this 
special situation only occurs if some of the political actors question the basic legitimation 
and criteria for public intervention and STI priority setting. That is, if dominant political 
actors put into question the basis of legitimate public intervention or they try to improve 
(taking the results of the aggregation process made by the political system) the way that 
public action aggregates societal preferences. 
As a concluding remark we see that the evolution of foresight, from simple information 
output to a central aggregation process, relates to the possibilities that foresight has for 
substituting (replacing-complementing) the basic political features of policy making. 
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